



Decisions of International and Foreign Tribunals
International Court of Justice
UNITED KINGDOM v. ICELAND; FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GERMANY v. ICELAND (FISHERIES JURISDICTION)1
On July 25, 1974, the Court delivered its Judgment on the merits in the two
cases concerning Fisheries Jurisdiction. By 10 votes to four, the Court has in
each case:
(1) found that the Icelandic Regulations of 1972 constituting a unilateral
extension of the exclusive fishing rights of Iceland to 50 nautical miles
from the baselines, are not opposable to the United Kingdom or
Germany;
(2) found that Iceland is not entitled unilaterally to exclude United Kingdom
or German fishing vessels from areas between the 12-mile and 50-mile
limits, or unilateraly to impose restrictions on their activities in such
areas;
(3) held that Iceland, on the one hand, and the United Kingdom and
Germany, on the other, are under mutual obligations to undertake
negotiations in good faith for an equitable solution of their differences;
and
(4) indicated certain factors which are to be taken into account in these
negotiations (preferential rights of Iceland, established rights of the
United Kingdom and Germany, interests of other States, conservation of
fishery resources, joint examination of measures required).
In Germany's proceeding, the Court also found that it was unable to accede to
the submission of Germany with reference to its claim to compensation.
*B.A. (1940) and J.D. (1942), Tulane University; member, American, Inter-American, Louisiana
State, New Orleans (member, Executive Committee), and Federal Bar Associations, American
Judicature Society and Maritime Law Association; president (1972-1973), New Orleans Chapter,
Federal Bar Association; president (1957-59), Phi Delta Phi International Legal Fraternity.
'See 6 INT'L LAW. 665 (July 1972) and 889 (Oct. 1972); 7 INT'L LAW. 232 (Jan. 1973), 505 (April
1973) and 920 (Oct. 1973); 8 INT'L LAW. 650 (July 1974).
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Among the ten Members of the Court who voted in favor of each Judgment,
the President and Judge Negendra Singh appended declarations; Judges
Forster, Bengzon, Jiminez de Ar6chaga, Nagendra Singh (already mentioned)
and Ruda appended a joint separate opinion; and Judges Dillard, de Castro and
Sir Humphrey Waldock appended separate opinions. Of the four judges who
voted against each Judgment, Judge Ignacio-Pinto appended a declaration and
Judges Gros, Petr6n and Onyeama appended dissenting opinions.2
In considering the applicable rules of International Law ( 49-78 of the
Judgment), the court noted that the first United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea (Geneva 1958) had adopted a Convention on the High Seas, Article 2
of which declared the principle of the freedom of the high seas, that is to say,
freedom of navigation, freedom of fishing, etc., to "be exercised by all States
with reasonable regard to the interests of other States in their exercise of the
freedom of the high seas." The question of the breadth of the territorial sea and
that of the extent of the coastal State's fishery jurisdiction had been left
unsettled at the 1958 Conference and were not settled at a second Conference
held in Geneva in 1960. Arising out of the general consensus at that second
Conference, however, two concepts had since crystallized as customary law: that
of a fishery zone, between the territorial sea and the high seas, within which the
coastal State could claim exclusive fisheries jurisdiction-it now being generally
accepted that that zone could extend to the 12-mile limit-and the concept, in
respect of waters adjacent to the zone of exclusive fishing rights, of preferential
fishing rights in favor of the coastal State in a situation of special dependence on
its fisheries. The Court was aware that in recent years a number of States had
asserted an extension of their exclusive fishery limits. The Court was likewise
aware of present endeavors, pursued under the auspices of the United Nations,
to achieve in a third Conference on the Law of the Sea the further codification
and progressive development of that branch of the law, as it was also of various
proposals and preparatory documents produced in that framework. But it
observed that, as a court of law, it could not render judgment sub specie legis
ferendae or anticipate the law before the legislator had laid it down, but must
take into account the existing rules of international law and the Exchange of
Notes of 1961.
The concept of preferential fishing rights had originated in proposals
submitted by Iceland at the Geneva Conference of 1958, which had confined
itself to recommending that:
... where, for the purpose of conservation, it becomes necessary to limit the total catch
of a stock or stocks of fish in an area of the high seas adjacent to the territorial sea of a
2lhe printed text of the Judgments, declarations and separate and dissenting opinions became
available within the next few days after the decisions. Orders and inquiries should be addressed to
the Distribution and Sales Section, Office of the United Nations, 1211 Geneva 10; the Sales Section,
United Nations, New York, N.Y. 10017; or any bookshop selling UN publications.
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coastal State, any other States fishing in that area should collaborate with the coastal
State to secure just treatment of such situation, by establishing agreed measures which
shall recognize any preferential requirements of the coastal State resulting from its
dependence upon the fishery concerned while having regard to the interests of the
other States.
At the 1960 Conference the same concept had been embodied in an amendment
incorporated by a substantial vote into one of the proposals concerning the
fishing zone. The contemporary practice of States showed that that concept, in
addition to its increasing and widespread acceptance, was being implemented
by agreements, either bilateral or multilateral. In the present case, in which the
exclusive fishery zone within the limit of 12 miles was not in dispute, the United
Kingdom had expressly recognized the preferential rights of the other party in
the disputed waters situated beyond that limit. There could be no doubt of the
exceptional dependence of Iceland on its fisheries and the situation appeared to
have been reached when it was imperative to preserve fish stocks in the interests
of rational and economic exploitation.
The Court further stated, however, that the very notion of preferential fishery
rights for the coastal State in a situation of special dependence, though it
implied a certain priority, could not imply the extinction of the concurrent
rights of other States. The fact that Iceland was entitled to claim preferential
rights did not suffice to justify its claim unilaterally to exclude British fishing
vessels from all fishing beyond the limit of 12 miles agreed to in 1961.
The United Kingdom had pointed out that its vessels had been fishing in
Icelandic waters for centuries, and Germany pointed out that its vessels had
been doing so since the end of the nineteenth century, and each urged that their
exclusion would have very serious adverse consequences. There, too, the
economic dependence and livelihood of whole communities were affected, and
both the United Kingdom and Germany shared the same interest in the
conservation of fish stocks as Iceland, which had for its part admitted the
existence of the Applicants' historic and special interests in fishing in the
disputed waters. Iceland's 1972 Regulations were therefore not opposable to
either the United Kingdom or Germany, but they disregarded the established
rights of those States and also the Exchange of Notes of 1961, and they
constituted an infringement of the principle (1958 Convention on the High Seas,
Art. 2) of reasonable regard for the interests of other States, including the
United Kingdom and Germany.
The Court concluded that to reach an equitable solution of the present
dispute it was necessary that the preferential fishing rights of Iceland should be
reconciled with .the traditional fishing rights of the United Kingdom and
Germany through the appraisal at any given moment of the relative dependence
of each State on the fisheries in question, while taking into account the rights of
other States and the needs of conservation. Thus, Iceland was not in law entitled
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unilaterally to exclude United Kingdom or Germany fishing vessels from areas
to seaward of the limit of 12 miles agreed to in 1961 or unilaterally to impose
restrictions on their activities. But that did not mean that the United Kingdom
or Germany was under no obligation to Iceland with respect to fishing in the
disputed waters in the 12-mile to 50-mile zone. Both sides had the obligation to
keep under review the fishery resources in those waters and to examine together,
in the light of the information available, the measures required for the
conservation and development, and equitable exploitation, of those resources,
taking into account any international agreement that might at present be in
force or might be reached after negotiation.
The most appropriate method for the solution of the dispute, the Court
continued, was clearly that of negotiation with a view of delimiting the rights
and interests of the parties and regulating equitably such questions as those of
catch-limitation, share allocations and related restrictions. The obligation to
negotiate flowed from the very nature of the respective rights of the parties and
corresponded to the provisions of the United Nations Charter concerning
peaceful settlement of disputes. The task before them would be to conduct their
negotiations on the basis that each must in good faith pay reasonable regard to
the legal rights of the other, to the facts of the particular situation and to the
interests of other States with established fishing rights in the area.
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND v. FRANCE (NUCLEAR TESTS)3
At public sittings held on July 4-9, 1974, Senator the Honorable Lionel
Murphy, Q.C., Attorney General of Australia, Professor D. P. O'Connell, of the
English, Australian and New Zealand Bars and Chichele Professor of Public
International Law in the University of Oxford, Mr. E. Lauterpacht, Q.C., of
the English Bar and Lecturer in the University of Cambridge, and Mr. M. H.
Byers, Q.C., Solicitor-General of Australia, presented the observations of the
Australian Government on the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of
the Application in Australia's case.
On July 10 and 11, 1974, Dr. A. M. Finlay, Attorney-General, Mr. R. C.
Savage, Solicitor-General, and Professor R. Q. Quentin-Baxter, Agent,
presented the observations of the New Zealand Government on the questions of
the jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the Application in New
Zealand's case. Judge Sir Humphrey Waldock put to the Agent of New Zealand
two questions, to which replies are to be given in writing. On July 11, 1974 the
Court also heard the oral answer given by Mr. Byers, the Solicitor-General of
Australia, to a question put by Judge Sir Humphrey Waldock in the Australia
case.
'See 7 INT'L LAW. 762 (July 1973) and 918 (Oct. 1973); 8 INT'L LAW. 191 (Jan. 1974) and 652 (July
1974).
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The French Government was not represented at the hearings.
On July 9, Mr. Kurt Waldheim paid his first official visit to the International
Court of Justice since becoming Secretary-General of the United Nations, when
he and the judges held talks in the Peace Palace, the seat of the Court. The staff
of the Registry of the Court were presented to the Secretary-General on this
occasion, as also were the President of the Carnegie Foundation, Mr. van
Rooijen, and Mr. Scheffer and Mr. Melgert, the President and Director,
respectively, of the Netherlands United Nations Association (VIRO).
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